Concepts of Philosophy challenges received conceptions of philosophy by way of critical engagement with Chinese and Japanese sources. Built on philologically sound readings of specific texts, the book lifts the discussion on the concept of philosophy to a global plane.

Nishida Kitarō is considered by many as the most important 20th century Japanese philosopher for his ability to employ modern concepts and terminologies, and use them to construct a unique system carrying a distinctly East Asian flavour. In this system, the notion of nothingness plays a fundamental part both in terms of epistemology and ontology. While this conceptual choice was also inspired by Buddhist sources, Nishida also drew on the theoretical philosophy of Hermann Cohen to elaborate, how nothingness could function (...) as both the guarantor of unity and generator of plurality. Close analysis, however, shows that Nishida’s appropriation of Cohen’s concept of the me on as a necessary feature in the „logic of pure knowledge“ sheds the constraints carefully put in place by Cohen. As becomes evident in a comparison between both thinker’s analysis of sensation, Nishida’s unrestricted use of Cohen’s terms collapses precisely those distinctions that give sensation its meaning in the rational assessment of reality. This leaves Nishida’s concept of reality without the critical potential to distinguish between different kinds of normativity and their inter-subjective validity. Nothingness, as Nishida uses the term, is not a logical concept, but functions as an aesthetic symbol invoking sublime ideas of a perfect reality that is one and whole, and at the same time rich and diverse.Nishida Kitarō gilt vielfach als der bedeutendste japanische Philosoph des 20. Jahrhunderts, wenn nicht generell. Zu dieser Einschätzung trug seine Fähigkeit bei, Konzepte und Terminologien der modernen Philosophie aufzugreifen und in ein eigenes System einzubauen, das gleichwohl einen besonderen, ostasiatischen Charakter hatte, auf den er sich auch explizit bezog. Fundamental für dieses System wie für seine Apostrophierung als genuin „östlich“ war die zentrale Rolle, die er dem Nichts sowohl in logischer als auch in ontologischer Hinsicht zusprach. In der Ausarbeitung dieser systematischen Funktion machte sich Nishida Überlegungen von Hermann Cohen zur Logik der reinen Erkenntnis zueigen, die er ausweitete und aus dem Gebiet der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis auf andere Formen menschlichen Weltzugangs übertrug. Die genauere Analyse zeigt, dass die Inanspruchnahme Cohens problematisch ist, weil Nishida zentrale Unterscheidungen Cohens überspielt. Das Nichts, bei Cohen ein notwendiger Umweg zur Sicherung „reiner“ Begriffe, wird bei Nishida zum Quell begrifflicher Unterscheidung selbst. Die Folgen dieser Hypertrophie des Nichts zeigen sich besonders in der Behandlung der Empfindung, die bei Cohen der bloßen Anzeige des Daseins dient, bei Nishida aber sowohl Dasein als auch Realität begründen soll. Nishidas Begriff von Wirklichkeit ermangelt daher einer fundamentalen kritischen Unterscheidung und bleibt letztlich leer, was jedoch durch den durch Übernahme von systemfremden Theoriestücken geschickt erzeugten Schein einer Fülle von Wirklichkeitsbezügen verdeckt wird. Im Kern ist Nishidas Umgang mit Begriffen ästhetisch. Er bildet mit ihnen keine nachvollziehbaren Theorien, sondern erzeugt gerade mit dem Nichtsbegriff den erhabenen Schein umfassender und lebendig-vielfältiger Einheit – ein Schein, der vielleicht inspirierend wirkt, sich aber theoretisch nicht zu bewähren vermag. (shrink)

_Concepts of Philosophy_ challenges received conceptions of philosophy by way of critical engagement with Chinese and Japanese sources. Built on philologically sound readings of specific texts, the book lifts the discussion on the concept of philosophy to a global plane.

_Concepts of Philosophy_ challenges received conceptions of philosophy by way of critical engagement with Chinese and Japanese sources. Built on philologically sound readings of specific texts, the book lifts the discussion on the concept of philosophy to a global plane.

_Concepts of Philosophy_ challenges received conceptions of philosophy by way of critical engagement with Chinese and Japanese sources. Built on philologically sound readings of specific texts, the book lifts the discussion on the concept of philosophy to a global plane.

Under the label of scientific metaphysics, many naturalist metaphysicians are moving away from a priori conceptual analysis and instead seek scientific explanations that will help bring forward a unified understanding of the world. This paper first reviews how our classical assumptions about ordinary objects fail to be true in light of quantum mechanics. The paper then explores how our experiences of ordinary objects arise by reflecting on how our neural system operates algorithmically. Contemporary models and simulations in computational neuroscience are (...) shown to provide a theoretical framework that does not conflict with existing fundamental physical theories, and nonetheless helps us make sense of the manifest image. It is argued that we must largely explain how the manifest image arises in algorithmic terms, so that we can pursue a metaphysics about ordinary objects that is scientifically well founded. (shrink)

This introductory chapter reviews the history of the reception of philosophy from Asia and the Islamic World in Western philosophy and argues in favor of conceptualizing philosophy from a more globally informed point of view.

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary (...) people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that normative considerations play an important role in causal cognition. For instance, when an agent violates a moral rule and thereby produces a negative outcome, she will be judged to be much more of a cause of the outcome, compared to someone who performed the same action but did not violate a norm. While there is a substantial amount of evidence reporting these effects, it is still a matter of debate how this evidence is to (...) be interpreted. In this paper, we engage with the three most influential classes of explanations, namely, (a) the Norm‐Sensitive Cognitive Process View, (b) the Normative Concept View, and (c) the Pragmatics View. We will outline how these theories explain the empirical results and in what ways they differ. We conclude with a reflection on how well these strategies do overall and what questions they still leave unanswered. (shrink)

Discussions in social psychology overlook an important way in which biases can be encoded in conceptual representations. Most accounts of implicit bias focus on ‘mere associations’ between features and representations of social groups. While some have argued that some implicit biases must have a richer conceptual structure, they have said little about what this richer structure might be. To address this lacuna, we build on research in philosophy and cognitive science demonstrating that concepts represent dependency relations between features. These relations, (...) in turn, determine the centrality of a feature f for a concept C: roughly, the more features of C depend on f, the more central f is for C. In this paper, we argue that the dependency networks that link features can encode significant biases. To support this claim, we present a series of studies that show how a particular brilliance-gender bias is encoded in the dependency networks which are part of the concepts of female and male academics. We also argue that biases which are encoded in dependency networks have unique implications for social cognition. (shrink)

[This book] develops an account of rationality and justice that is tradition specific.-http://undpress.nd.edu.

C P Ormell; Ideology and the Reform of School Mathematics, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 3, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–54, https://doi.org/10.1.

C A Winch; Education, Literacy and the Development of Rationality, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 187–200, https://d.

C Bailey; The Notion of Development and Moral Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 3, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 65–80, https://doi.org/10.111.

C Bailey; The Notion of Development and Moral Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 3, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 65–80, https://doi.org/10.111.

C. Lewy; VI—Entailment and Propositional Identity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 June 1964, Pages 107–122, https://doi.org/10.1.

According to Paul Draper and Ryan Nichols the practice of philosophy of religion—and especially its theistically committed practitioners—regularly violate norms of rationality, objectivity, and impartiality in the review, assessment, and weighing of evidence. (Draper and Nichols, 2013). We consider the charge of epistemic partisanship and show that the observational data does not illustrate a norm-violating form of inquiry. The major oversight in the charge of epistemic partiality is the epistemically central role of prior probabilities in determining the significance of incongruent (...) evidence. We argue that reasonably divergent views on the likelihood of theism on incongruent evidence can also account for differences in significance. We conclude that it is an epistemic requirement that committed theists regard incongruent evils as much less significant evidence against theism than do lukewarm theists, agnostics, or atheists. Differences in the significance of evidence quite properly reflect differences in commitments to theism. (shrink)

C. K. Grant; X*—On a Definition of Knowledge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 73, Issue 1, 1 June 1973, Pages 157–166, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

C W Evers, J C Walker; Pyrotechnics Defended: a reply to Jim Mackenzie, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 139–142, http.

C A Wringe; Reply to Antony Flew, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–158, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1979.t.

C. H. Whiteley; I—The Presidential Address*: Confirmation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 1–14, https://doi.org.

C. J. F. Williams; VI*—Is Identity a Relation?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 80, Issue 1, 1 June 1980, Pages 81–100, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

C A Wringe; Pupils’ Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 103–115, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1973.tb00475.

C A Wringe; Pupils’ Rights, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 7, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 103–115, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1973.tb00475.

C A Wringe; Reply to Antony Flew, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 13, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 149–158, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1979.t.

C. A. J. Coady; VIII*—Descartes' Other Myth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 121–142, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

C. A. J. Coady; VIII*—Descartes' Other Myth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 121–142, https://doi.org/10.1093/ar.

Daniel C. Dennett; XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 213–226, https://doi.o.

Daniel C. Dennett; XIII*—Styles of Mental Representation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 213–226, https://doi.o.

The acquisition of fully informed consent presents a central ethical problem for the procurement and storage of human tissue in biobanks. The tension lies between the apparent necessity of obtaining informed consent from potential research subjects and the projected future use of the tissue. Specifically, under the doctrine of informed consent medical researchers are required to inform their potential research subjects about the relevant risks and purposes of the proposed research (Declaration of Helsinki, 2008, “Section 24.” Accessed November 1, 2009. (...) http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html). However, because human tissue – when stored in biobanks – can be put to multifarious uses, the information that medical researchers are expected to divulge to their subjects is epistemologically inaccessible. Biobank researchers are thus thought to be unable to obtain informed consent from their subjects, making the practice ethically suspicious. We propose that such suspicions of ethical failure should be reconsidered by presenting two possible solutions. Firstly we argue that the epistemological difficulty might be partially solved by adopting the “waiver model” of informed consent. Secondly, we put forward an argument that individual consent can be supplemented by group ethical models. We thus conclude that while informed consent is problematic for biobank researchers, alternative ethical solutions are available. (shrink)

G. C. J. Midgley; XIV—Linguistic Rules, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 271–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

C W Evers, J C Walker; Pyrotechnics Defended: a reply to Jim Mackenzie, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 139–142, http.

Alternative displays of effect size statistics can enhance the understandability and impact of validity evidence in a variety of applied settings. Arguably, the proliferation of alternative effect size statistics has been limited due to the lack of user-friendly tools to create them. Common statistical packages do not readily produce these alternative effect sizes and existing tools are outdated and inaccessible. In this paper, I introduce a free-to-use web-based calculator (https://dczhang.shinyapps.io/expectancyApp/) for generating alternative effect size displays from empirical data. This (...) calculator requires no mathematical or programming expertise, and therefore, is ideal for academics and practitioners. I also present results from an empirical study that demonstrates the benefits of alternative effect size displays for enhancing lay people’s perceived understandability of validity information and attitudes toward the use of standardized testing for college admissions. (shrink)

G. C. J. Midgley; XIV—Linguistic Rules, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 271–290, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristot.

Cognition is commonly taken to be computational manipulation of representations. These representations are assumed to be digital, but it is not usually specified what that means and what relevance it has for the theory. I propose a specification for being a digital state in a digital system, especially a digital computational system. The specification shows that identification of digital states requires functional directedness, either for someone or for the system of which it is a part. In the case or digital (...) representations, to be a token of a representational type, where the function of the type is to represent. [An earlier version of this paper was discussed in the web-conference "Interdisciplines" https://web.archive.org/web/20100221125700/http://www.interdisciplines.org/adaptation/papers/7 ]. (shrink)

Barry C. Smith; VI*—Understanding Language, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 109–142, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

V. C. Chappell; IV*—Stuff and Things, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 61–76, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

Does exploration of the gut microbiota–brain axis expand our understanding of what it means to be human? Recognition and conceptualization of a gut microbiota–brain axis challenges our study of the nervous system. Here, integrating gut microbiota–brain research into the metaorganism model is proposed. The metaorganism—an expanded, dynamic unit comprising the host and commensal organisms—asserts a radical blurring between man and microbe. The metaorganism nervous system interacts with the exterior world through microbial‐colored lenses. Ongoing studies have reported that gut microbes contribute (...) to brain function and pathologies, even shaping higher neurological functions. How will continued collaborative efforts (e.g., between neurobiology and microbiology), including partnerships with the arts (e.g., philosophy), contribute to the knowledge of microbe‐to‐mind interactions? While this is not a systemic review, this nascent field is briefly described, highlighting ongoing challenges and recommendations for emerging gut microbiota–brain research. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/lP9gOW8StXg. (shrink)

Special Issue “Risks of artificial general intelligence”, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 26/3 (2014), ed. Vincent C. Müller. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/teta20/26/3# - Risks of general artificial intelligence, Vincent C. Müller, pages 297-301 - Autonomous technology and the greater human good - Steve Omohundro - pages 303-315 - - - The errors, insights and lessons of famous AI predictions – and what they mean for the future - Stuart Armstrong, Kaj Sotala & Seán S. Ó hÉigeartaigh - pages 317-342 - - (...) - The path to more general artificial intelligence - Ted Goertzel - pages 343-354 - - - Limitations and risks of machine ethics - Miles Brundage - pages 355-372 - - - Utility function security in artificially intelligent agents - Roman V. Yampolskiy - pages 373-389 - - - GOLEM: towards an AGI meta-architecture enabling both goal preservation and radical self-improvement - Ben Goertzel - pages 391-403 - - - Universal empathy and ethical bias for artificial general intelligence - Alexey Potapov & Sergey Rodionov - pages 405-416 - - - Bounding the impact of AGI - András Kornai - pages 417-438 - - - Ethics of brain emulations - Anders Sandberg - pages 439-457. (shrink)

John C. Hall; III—Quantity of Pleasure, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 67, Issue 1, 1 June 1967, Pages 35–52, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotel.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) to aid legal decision making has become prominent. This paper investigates the use of AI in a critical issue in employment law, the determination of a worker’s status—employee vs. independent contractor—in two common law countries (the U.S. and Canada). This legal question has been a contentious labor issue insofar as independent contractors are not eligible for the same benefits as employees. It has become an important societal issue due to the ubiquity of the gig (...) economy and the recent disruptions in employment arrangements. To address this problem, we collected, annotated, and structured the data for all Canadian and Californian court cases related to this legal question between 2002 and 2021, resulting in 538 Canadian cases and 217 U.S. cases. In contrast to legal literature focusing on complex and correlated characteristics of the employment relationship, our statistical analyses of the data show very strong correlations between the worker’s status and a small subset of quantifiable characteristics of the employment relationship. In fact, despite the variety of situations in the case law, we show that simple, off-the-shelf AI models classify the cases with an out-of-sample accuracy of more than 90%. Interestingly, the analysis of misclassified cases reveals consistent misclassification patterns by most algorithms. Legal analyses of these cases led us to identify how equity is ensured by judges in ambiguous situations. Finally, our findings have practical implications for access to legal advice and justice. We deployed our AI model via the open-access platform, https://MyOpenCourt.org/, to help users answer employment legal questions. This platform has already assisted many Canadian users, and we hope it will help democratize access to legal advice to large crowds. (shrink)

B C Hurst; Cooper on Equality and Excellence in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–124, https://doi.org/1.

B C Hurst; Cooper on Equality and Excellence in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–124, https://doi.org/1.